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This paper is a first step in an endeavour to assert an augmented generic-design hypothesis (which 
concluded our book, The Cognitive Artifacts of Designing, Visser, 2006b): analysed from a cognitive 
viewpoint, design has specific characteristics that distinguish it from other cognitive activities, but also takes 
on different forms depending on the main dimensions of the design situation. Examination of this hypothesis, 
which is the object of this paper, may have consequences for both theory and practice in the domain of design. 
Support for the hypothesis may have consequences for design environments, assistance, and education. It 
may, for example, guide the development of modalities for supporting designers when they are involved in 
the construction of representations or in the management of constraints and criteria. Given the mostly 
dispersed and anecdotal discussion of the different components that make up the hypothesis, our aim here is 
to articulate them in an overview paper.  
Reviewing various empirical studies of activities "as diverse as software design, architectural design, 
naming and letter-writing," Thomas and Carroll (1979/1984) stated that these different design activities 
"appear to have much in common" (p. 234). A number of authors have defended that, compared to other 
professionals, designers have specific forms of knowledge (e.g., Cross, 2001b; 2002b ). Combining the 
positions underlying these two claims, Goel and Pirolli (1989; 1992) proposed the notion "generic design." 
Still other studies focus on the differences between design in different domains, examining a third aspect in 
this analysis concerning the nature of design (e.g., Akin, 2001; Purcell & Gero, 1996). In this paper we review 
and discuss these different aspects of design, focussing on the third one, whose discussion seems the least 
organised in the design literature. The position defended in this paper is the following: there are both (1) 
significant similarities between the design activities implemented in different situations and (2) significant 
differences between design and other cognitive activities; yet, (3) characteristics of a design situation (i.e., 
characteristics related to the design process, the designers, and the artefact) introduce specificities in the 
corresponding cognitive activities and structures that are used, and in the resulting designs. We thus augment 
the generic-design hypothesis (1 and 2) with that of different forms of designing (3). 
The augmented generic-design hypothesis thus connects three different positions with respect to design 
and nondesign activities that have been espoused, more or less explicitly, by different authors in the domain 
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of cognitive design research. Given the implicitness to this respect that is present in many papers on design, 
the review and discussion proposed in this paper seem useful. Generally, papers are concerned with only one 
position, sometimes two (the generic-design hypothesis), but the three have rarely been articulated together 
(but see Akin, 2001, discussed below). In addition, corroboration of the generic-design hypothesis is nearly 
exclusively grounded in Goel and Pirolli's (1989; 1992) work. Except for these authors' research, this double-
sided hypothesis has received little substantiation through comparative cognitive analyses. 
We qualify our hypothesis as "cognitive," because in the literature the term "generic design" most often is 
used in other than cognitive acceptations. The notion is used in the domains of software engineering (cf. 
Gamma's design patterns), AI and knowledge acquisition (e.g., KADS and successor work), based, for 
example, on Chandrasekaran's (1983) "generic tasks," or notions such as "generic design methods" and other 
"generic design agents" (see, e.g., Warfield, 1994). All these references are normatively based approaches to 
design, not concerned with the cognitive validity of the proposed units, be they design patterns, tasks, or 
methods. The present text focuses on cognitively oriented analyses of design activities. 
Outline of the paper. This introduction presents our augmented generic-design hypothesis in the context of 
Goel and Pirolli's (1992) generic-design hypothesis and the view of design's domain independence defended 
by several other authors. Sections 1 and 2 briefly discuss the two constituents of the generic-design 
hypothesis, that is, the existence of commonalities between designing in different situations (section 1) and 
differences between designing and nondesigning (section 2). In the main section of this paper, that is, section 
3, we discuss the third constituent of our hypothesis (that is, design takes different forms depending on 
characteristics of the design situation); we do so through an examination of candidate variables underlying 
such forms of design, outlining a number of directions for further elaboration. In section 4, the Conclusion, 
we will discuss the augmented generic-design hypothesis and complete it with a fourth constituent. 
The generic-design hypothesis. Goel and Pirolli (1992) formulated their "intuitions about generic design" as a 
hypothesis that combined two assumptions: "problem spaces exhibit major invariants across design problem-
solving situations and major variants across design and nondesign problem-solving situations" (p. 399). 
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According to Goel (1994), the authors aim to "motivate the notion of generic design within information-
processing theory" (p. 53), that is, within the symbolic information processing framework that Newell and 
Simon (1972) developed in order to analyse problem solving from a cognitive viewpoint.  
Goel and Pirolli (1989; 1992) seem to have made a strong case for the generic-design hypothesis. Their study 
may, however, be criticised on two points. On the one hand, certain flaws in the choice of nondesign tasks 
considerably weaken the authors' characterisation of design—which mainly depends on its contrast to 
nondesign (design is qualified as "X" by contrast to nondesign being "not X"). First, the nondesign tasks were 
brief, artificial games (that took 15 to 40 minutes). Second—something, moreover, noticed by the authors 
themselves—the study "purposefully took two points (ill-structured design tasks and well-structured game 
tasks) at the extremities of the spectrum of problem types" (Goel, 1994, p. 71). The author considers that, 
"given that [Goel and Pirolli] have found interesting differences, it would be instructive to… explore the 
intermittent points in the space" (Goel, 1994, p. 71), but this examination has not been conducted, as far as we 
know. On the other hand, the design tasks were examined in artificially restricted laboratory situations. The 
participants in Goel and Pirolli's (1989; 1992) study were professionals, but the design sessions, varying from 
2 to 3 hours, "simulated the 'design sketch' exercises which are an integral part of the training program of 
many design disciplines" (Goel, 1994, p. 54)—tasks from which generalisation to design is not immediate, in 
our opinion. Such an approach is typical for the classical cognitive-psychology research on "problem solving" 
tasks. Since the beginning of our cognitive design research, we have been questioning the representativeness 
of such studies for professional design projects (in Visser, 1987b, for example, we identified specificities of 
professional design that are not observed in limited, artificially constructed design situations). In addition, we 
have come to question the appropriateness of the "problem solving" paradigm for the cognitive analysis of 
design (Visser, 2006b). The present paper focuses on cognitive design studies performed in real, professional 
work situations—even if we also review data from other experimental, less ecological research that is related 
to our topic. We will use, however, the notion "problem" and "problem solving" as authors use them, not 
always again questioning this view here. 
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The domain independence of design. Zimring and Craig (2001) present the "domain independence" of 
design as a notion similar to that of generic design. One may interpret domain independence, however, as 
only referring to design being invariant across domains, not necessarily to design differing significantly from 
other cognitive activities. It is in this more restricted sense that many design researchers and practitioners 
defend the idea of a domain-independent theory of design. Certain authors indeed defend such a position 
because of similarities observed between two or more domains of design.  
Zimring and Craig (2001) consider that "common descriptions of design—that designing involves 
abductive reasoning, construction, ill-defined problem solving skills—…are not always sharp enough to both 
distinguish design from other types of problem solving and unite design across different design-related 
disciplines" (p. 125). The authors consider that the analysis and description of design in terms of "mid-level 
constructs" "may be more profitable in scaling research across disciplines" (p. 126). As examples of mid-level 
processes or types of reasoning, the authors present mental simulation, decision-making, and analogical 
reasoning. 
During the 1995 "Design Dialogues: one" meeting, entitled "Universal Theory of Design: is a domain 
independent theory of design possible?"1 the participants explored "the reasons for the apparent lack of 
progress in design research over [the decade 1985-1995] and in particular whether the search for an 
atemporal, acultural, domain independent theory of design [was] a reasonable or realistic goal." During this 
meeting, Cross stated, "a primary goal of the Design Research Society since its founding in the 1960s [had] 
been a domain independent theory of design within the context of a science of design" (from the Meeting 
report, see Note 1). In her Meeting report, McDonnell wrote, "on the question of whether theories, of 
whatever kind, can be domain independent, there was a… diversity of views.… some participants believing 
that some form of universal theory is possible ranged against those who argued for the incommensurability of 
different views of design or that the elimination of context necessary for a universal theory would result in an 
activity unrecognisable as design."  
                                                 
1 "Design Dialogues: one" was "the first in an occasional series of discussion meetings on design theory sponsored by the 
Design Research Society," organised by McDonnell and Logan at University College London, on May 17, 1995. We 
quote McDonnell's meeting report, which until recently could be retrieved via internet, but is no longer accessible. 
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There has been much discussion in the design-research community around the relations between design 
and science (Sargent, 1994), some authors considering that a design science is to be developed (Hubka & 
Eder, 1987), others, such as Cross (2001b; 2002b), judging that the two are to be clearly distinguished. For 
Hubka and Eder (1987), "design science addresses the problem of determining and categorizing all regular 
phenomena of the systems to be designed, and of the design process" (p. 124). Cross (2002b) wishes to 
develop "'design as a discipline', based upon a 'science of design', not a 'design science'" (cf. also Simon, 
1969/1999, characterising the "science of design" in his Sciences of the Artificial). For Cross (2002b), "design 
science implies an explicitly organised, rational and wholly systematic approach to design; not just the 
utilisation of scientific knowledge of artefacts, but design in some sense [as] a scientific activity itself.… 
Science of design refers to that body of work which attempts to improve our understanding of design through 
'scientific' (i.e., systematic, reliable) methods of investigation. Let us be clear that a 'science of design' is not 
the same as a 'design science'. The study of design leaves open the interpretation of the nature of design." (see 
also Cross, 2001b) 
"Domain" in the context of "domain independence" is generally equated with a "discipline (of practice)," 
such as engineering, architecture, computer science, or product design2. It may be used in a wider acceptation. 
Discussing domain-generality versus domain-specificity in cognition, Frensch and Buchner (1999, p. 142, 
quoted in Zimring & Craig, 2001, p. 126) define a domain as "anything that a given constraint can potentially 
be generalized to and from." In this paper, we will be concerned with design "situations" that can be 
characterised on three main dimensions, that is, the design process, the designers, and the artefact. The 
augmented generic-design hypothesis translates our claim that, if we do not "eliminate the context" of design 
(cf. McDonnell quoted previously), we may observe different forms of design in different design situations. 
1. Design is one: commonalities between designing in different situations 
From the early 1980s on, authors in the domain of design research have started to characterise design as a 
cognitive activity, highlighting the differences from design as it had been represented until then in 
                                                 
2 We use the term "product design" where many authors use "industrial design," because we reserve "industrial design" in 
a more general acception, that is, for design perfomed in a professional, industrial situation. 
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prescriptive models underlying design methods (e.g., Pahl & Beitz, 1977/1996). An important reference for 
this new, more cognitively oriented approach to design has been Simon's (1969/1999) analysis of design in 
The Sciences of the Artificial. At the end of the 1990s, the following characterisation of design was prevailing 
in the domain of cognitive design research—even if authors may differ regarding certain characteristics (see 
hereunder xi. Design activity is mostly opportunistically organised). Concerning only two qualities, authors 
generally continue to adhere strictly to Simon's (1969/1999) position and analysis of design (see hereunder i 
and v). For most characteristics, authors have elaborated on Simon's characterisation, not so much 
contradicting him, as extending generally his analysis (see hereunder, especially, points iii, vi, vii, viii, ix, and 
x). For a last series, they have revised considerably Simon's position (see hereunder, especially, points ii, iv, 
and xi) (for a more detailed and more critical discussion of Simon's, 1969/1999, positions, see Visser, 2006b).  
(i) Design is a type of cognitive activity rather than a professional status. In 1969, Simon (1969/1999) states 
that "design" is not restricted to engineers, who are not the only professional designers. "Everyone 
designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones." 
(p. 111)  
(ii) Design is a problem-solving activity. This is one of Simon's central stances with respect to design, based 
on the symbolic information-processing framework developed in Newell and Simon (1972). In addition, 
Simon qualifies design as an "ordinary" problem-solving activity, that is, a problem-solving activity for 
which no new and hitherto unknown problem-solving concepts or techniques are necessary. According 
to his "nothing special" position (presented for scientific thinking in Klahr & Simon, 2001, p. 76), "no 
qualitatively new components" need to be introduced in the classic general problem-solving 
mechanisms, in order to be able to handle design problems (Simon, 1973/1984, p. 197). No "special 
logic" is necessary (Simon, 1969/1999, p. 115)—even if Simon "admits" that standard logic is to be 
adapted to the search for alternative solution elements (p. 124). In recent years, we have started to amend 
Simon's (1969/1999) position: we have developed the idea that designing is more appropriately qualified 
as the construction of representations (Visser, 2006b, 2006c). From a formal viewpoint, design is 
certainly a "problem solving" activity: based on the design specifications, designers are rarely able to 
evoke from memory a pre-existing problem-solving procedure. Numerous studies have shown that, for 
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many components of a design task, designers need to construct procedures in order to formulate a 
solution. However, qualifying design "simply" as problem solving is not very informative. In this paper, 
we cannot further detail these ideas (see Visser, 2006b). 
(iii) Design problems are considered ill-defined (or "ill-structured" in Simon's, 1973/1984, terms): this design 
feature, noticed from the earliest cognitive design studies on (Eastman, 1969, 1970; Reitman, 1964; 
Thomas & Carroll, 1979/1984; Voss & Post, 1988), has been substantiated in many different kinds of 
studies since then, and continues to be considered as a specific characteristic of design (Akin, 2001; 
Michalek & Papalambros, 2002; Ormerod, 2005). Rittel and Webber (1973/1984) speak of "wicked" 
problems, which have no definitive formulation: each formulation corresponds to at least one solution 
(Buckingham Shum, 1997; Conklin, 2006) (for a discussion of the distinction between ill-defined and 
wicked problems, see Visser, 2006b, p. 142). 
(iv) In his problem-solving approach to design, Simon (1969/1999; 1973/1984) distinguishes two stages in 
problem solving: problem structuring and problem solving. Analysis, synthesis, and evaluation are 
examples of another decomposition of design proposed by authors adopting, with more or less profound 
modifications, Simon's approach to design—or, more generally, Newell and Simon's (1972) approach 
(Akin, 1986a, 1986b; Baykan, 1996; Goel, 1994; Goel & Pirolli, 1992; Hamel, 1995; Lebahar, 1983). 
However, such stages can be distinguished only in theory as distinct activities: problem analysis and 
solution elaboration progress in parallel, rather than in separate, consecutive stages. Furthermore, 
designers constantly generate new task goals and redefine task constraints. Even if they are cognisant of 
prescriptive models distinguishing analysis and synthesis, designers do not follow them systematically 
(Akin, 1979/1984; Carroll & Rosson, 1985; Cross, 1984; Dasgupta, 1989; Visser, 1987a). Authors who 
analyse design problem solving in terms of "problem space" and "solution space" have proposed the 
notion of "co-evolution" of these two spaces (Dorst & Cross, 2001; Maher, Poon, & Boulanger, 1996; cf. 
also our idea of problem/solution pairs, Visser, 1991). 
(v) Design is a "satisficing" activity: rather than to optimize, that is, to calculate the optimum value, or to 
choose the best solution among all possible solutions, designers "settle for the good enough" (Simon, 
1971/1975, p. 1), accepting a satisfactory solution (Simon, 1987/1995, p. 246). As they have to decide 
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without complete information, they have no other choice. This characteristic has been observed by 
various authors (Akin, 2001; Ball, Lambell, Reed, & Reid, 2001). According to Akin (2001), however, 
designers from different disciplines vary on this point: while architects indeed proceed to satisficing, 
engineering designers adopt more objective methods in their selection among possibilities and may 
proceed to optimisation. 
(vi) Design generally involves complex problems that are rarely decomposable into independent 
subproblems. Of course, designers proceed to decomposition, in order to make their problems more 
manageable and easier to solve. In our view, Simon and many design researchers who follow him 
overestimate, however, the role of systematic problem decomposition, especially through balanced, 
stepwise refinement. In other than relatively routine design projects, designers rarely decompose in a 
systematic way (cf. our critique of Simon's "overestimating the role of systematic problem 
decomposition," Visser, 2006b, pp. 68-70). Moreover, one and the same design component often can be 
decomposed in different ways (Reitman, 1964, p. 296). Simon himself notes that the interdependencies 
among the subproblems resulting from problem decomposition "are likely to be neglected or 
underemphasized." "Such unwanted side effects accompany all design processes that are as complex as 
the architectural ones" that he considers in his text (Simon, 1973/1984, p. 191). According to Akin 
(2001), architects use idiosyncratic strategies to decompose a problem into subproblems and to integrate 
their solutions into a global solution afterwards, whereas in electronic hardware or mechanical design, 
the interaction between the parts are "theoretically determined." Notice that Simon (1973/1984, pp. 200-
201) analyses complex systems such as social systems as "nearly decomposable" and that Goel (1995) 
considers the modules resulting from decomposition as "leaky."  
(vii) Designers often tend to generate, at the very start of a project, a few simple objectives in order to create 
an initial solution kernel to which they then are sticking in what is going to become their global design 
solution. Such an initial solution kernel, which Darke (1979/1984) qualified as "primary generator," has 
been identified by many other authors and has received labels such as "kernel idea," "central concept," 
"early solution conjecture," "primary position," and "guiding theme" (Cross, 2001a, 2004b; Guindon, 
Krasner, & Curtis, 1987; Kant, 1985; Lawson, 1994; Rowe, 1987; Ullman, Dietterich, & Staufer, 1988). 
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The ensuing process has been qualified as "position-driven" design, "early fixation," "premature 
commitment," "early crystallisation," or "solution fixation" (Ball, Evans, & Dennis, 1994; Cross, 2001a; 
Goel, 1995) (we will come back upon this characteristic, arguing that it requires inspection). 
(viii) Rather than one solution, which would be "the" "correct" solution, design problems have several, 
acceptable solutions, which are more or less satisfying. This characteristic of design problems, related to 
their ill definedness and the satisficing character of designing, has been observed in many studies and 
domains, for example, architecture (Akin, 2001; Eastman, 1970), mechanical design (Frankenberger & 
Badke-Schaub, 1999), software design (Malhotra, Thomas, Carroll, & Miller, 1980), and traffic-signal 
setting (Bisseret, Figeac-Letang, & Falzon, 1988). 
(ix) Design problems and solutions lack pre-existing, objective evaluation criteria (Bonnardel, 1991; Ullman 
et al., 1988). As evaluative references are forms of knowledge, designers' expertise in a domain 
influences how they use them (D'Astous, Détienne, Visser, & Robillard, 2004). Given that, in a 
collaborative design setting, designers may have different representations of their project, solution 
proposals are evaluated not only based on purely technical, "objective" evaluative criteria; they are also 
the object of negotiation, and the final agreement concerning a solution often results from compromises 
between designers (Martin, Détienne, & Lavigne, 2001). In addition, not only solution proposals, but 
also the evaluation criteria and procedures themselves undergo evaluation (D'Astous et al., 2004). 
(x) Reuse of knowledge (from specific previous design projects) through analogical reasoning has been 
observed in many cognitive design studies as a central approach in design (Ball & Christensen, 2007; 
Ball, Ormerod, & Morley, 2004; Bhatta & Goel, 1997; Burkhardt, Détienne, & Wiedenbeck, 1997; 
Casakin & Goldschmidt, 1999; Détienne, 2002; Maiden, 1991; Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1991; Visser, 1995, 
1996). Of course, this use of specific knowledge is combined with that of generic knowledge (especially, 
from design methodology, the application domain, and the technical domains that underlie the design 
project). Most examples of reuse concern software design (Détienne, 2002; Visser, 1987b), but we also 
observed it on product design (in the Delft study, Visser, 1995).  
(xi) Design activity is mostly opportunistically organised: designers proceed in a non-systematic, 
multidirectional way (at moments top-down, at others bottom-up, at moments in breadth, at others in 
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depth), formulating plans that are more or less local, at both high, abstract and low, concrete levels. The 
basis for such organisation is designers taking into consideration the data that they have at the time: 
specifically, the state of their design in progress, their representation of this design, the information at 
their disposal, and their knowledge (cf. the qualification of design as "situated").  
This last point needs some discussion, because not all researchers share our conclusion that design is 
opportunistically organised (for a detailed discussion, see ch. 21.4 The opportunistic organization of 
design: Decomposition and planning, and especially its section "Discussion of our opportunistic-
organization position," in Visser, 2006b, pp. 163-177). Especially Davies (1991) and Ball and Ormerod 
(1995) adopt other positions. According to Davies (1991), "expert programmers adopt a broadly top-
down approach to the programming task, at least during its initial stages" (p. 186; see our discussion of 
expertise below in Section 3.2). Ball and Ormerod (1995) claim, "much of what has been described as 
opportunistic design behavior appears to reflect a mix of breadth-first and depth-first modes of solution 
development" (p. 131), even if design is also "subject to potentially diverging influences such as 
serendipitous events and design failures" (p. 145). Obviously, designers may proceed top-down and 
depth-first, or top-down and breadth-first—or bottom-up combined with depth-first or breadth-first. 
What we wish to emphasise is that (1) they often do so occasionally and locally, rather than 
systematically throughout the entire design process; (2) a top-down - bottom-up mix can take different 
forms, and even if a mix pattern has several occurrences—and thus gets a systematic character—these 
will generally be interspersed with other ways of proceeding, so that "top-down" and "bottom-up" are 
inappropriate as general qualifications of designers' activity; and, especially, (3) an occasional, local top-
down - bottom-up and or breadth-first - depth-first mix are just some of the various forms in which 
opportunism can reveal itself in design. 
As regards the "broadly top-down with opportunistic local episodes" (Davies, 1991) versus 
"opportunistic, with hierarchical episodes" (Visser, 1994a) issue, we follow Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth 
(1979, p. 307). These authors have proposed that the systematic refinement model be considered as a 
special case of the opportunistic model, which allows various organisational structures of an activity—
rather than only one, or a mix of two structures. An opportunistically organised activity may have 
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hierarchical episodes at a local level, but its global organisation is not hierarchical (Visser, 1994a). 
With respect to the structured character of design organisation, opportunism proponents (Guindon et al., 
1987; Kant, 1985; Ullman et al., 1988; Visser, 1987a; Voss, Greene, Post, & Penner, 1983) question the 
systematic implementation both of a depth-first (or breadth-first) and of a top-down refinement (or 
bottom-up) approach. 
Notice that Goel (1995), who presents design as a quite systematic process, also remarks that "designers 
differ substantially in the path they take through [the design problem] space and how quickly or slowly 
they traverse its various phases" (p. 123). In addition, he notices that "problem structuring" (in his 
model, the first phase of design development) "occurs at the beginning of the task,… but may also recur 
periodically as needed" (p. 114). 
These 11 qualifications, based on studies in different application domains, have contributed much to the 
development of the position that there are important commonalities between the implementations of design in 
different domains, that is, one of the two components of the generic-design hypothesis. Despite the more or 
less implicit adherence to this hypothesis in the design literature, there has been little systematic empirical 
research, however, to corroborate it—that is, apart from Goel and Pirolli's (1989; 1992) work. In the rest of 
this section, we present some rare studies concluding to the existence of more or less similar features between 
designing in different situations.  
There is a series of early cognitive design studies conducted by Carroll and various colleagues in different 
design disciplines. In their review of this work, Thomas and Carroll (1979/1984) conclude that software 
design, architectural design, naming, and letter writing have many commonalities (as noticed in our 
introduction).  
Bringing together observations gathered on product design (in the Delft study, Visser, 1995) and on 
software design (Visser, 1987b), we concluded that designers from these two disciplines proceeded to reuse. 
Reymen et al. (2006) have performed empirical case studies in three design disciplines—architectural, 
software and mechanical design—in order to develop domain-independent design knowledge. The authors 
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conclude that the supposed "important differences" between these design disciplines "concern mainly 
differences in terminology" (p. 151). One may notice, however, that the authors did not observe designers at 
work. They conducted interviews with designers concerning particular projects and analysed the 
documentation of these projects. 
In his paper How is a piece of software like a building? Toward general design theory and methods, Gross 
(2003) advances the thesis that these two types of artefacts are alike on several dimensions: their size, level of 
complexity, lifetime, and degree to which their components are subject to change, the proportion of reusable 
components in their structure, the sanitary risks and safety concerns that particular uses or states of these 
artefacts may introduce, the type of their use or user, and the differences between their client and user. 
However, Gross (2003) does not refer to empirical work. We will come back to most of these dimensions 
below. 
Notice that in the abovementioned studies, presented in order to show commonalities between designing 
in different situations, these different "situations" were always different domains of discipline—never 
different conditions of age, sex, expertise, or working conditions (e.g., process variables), for example.  
2. Design is different from nondesign 
The idea that design significantly differs from nondesign activities is stated explicitly less often than its 
counterpart in the generic-design hypothesis (that is, that design activities implemented in different situations 
are significantly similar). Cross (2001b; 2002b ) contends—as the underlying axiom of the design discipline 
he defends— that there are "forms of knowledge special to the competencies and abilities of a designer." Yet, 
it is not trivial to indicate what makes design specific.  
Expertise: design versus nondesign. In his overview paper on design expertise, Cross (2004b) concludes 
that "expertise in design has some aspects that are significantly different from expertise in other fields" (p. 
427). Referring to results from several empirical studies, he observes that the classical depth-first (novices) - 
breadth-first (experts) (or top-down - bottom-up) difference is not as systematically displayed in design as in 
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other problem-solving tasks. The other main characteristics identified by Cross (2004b) are the following. A 
key feature of design expertise is "problem framing," that is, structuring and formulating the problem. Expert 
designers are solution-focused rather than problem-focused, especially in their particular domain of expertise 
(cf. also Lawson's, 1979/1984, results differentiating students from architecture and science on the solution-
focused - problem-focused dimension). Expert designers frequently switch between different types of 
cognitive activity. Contrary to what is considered "good practice" in design methodology, they readily 
commit to an early solution concept that they elaborate, at all costs, patching it, if necessary: they do so 
instead of generating and examining a large number of alternative solution concepts, and of abandoning their 
solution concept when confronted with problems in its development (cf. point vii in Section 1). 
Advocating that, from a cognitive viewpoint, design is definitely different from other activities, Goel and 
Pirolli (in Goel, 1994; Goel & Pirolli, 1989) quoted the examples of chess and medical diagnosis. These were, 
however, not the nondesign tasks examined by the authors in order to corroborate their generic-design 
hypothesis. To this aim, they compared protocols (collected by Newell & Simon, 1972, and published in their 
Human Problem Solving) concerning cryptarithmetic and the Moore-Anderson logic task with protocols the 
authors themselves had collected in three design disciplines, architecture, mechanical engineering, and 
instructional design (Goel, 1994; Goel & Pirolli, 1989). In their conclusion, the authors notice that, now that 
results have been obtained with such extreme well-structured tasks (cryptarithmetic and the Moore-Anderson 
logic task are two perfectly defined play problems), other activities need to be examined. 
In The Sciences of the Artificial, Simon (1969/1999) presents as different the cognitive activities 
implemented in economics and in design. Analysing economic theories, he is very sensitive to the way in 
which economists idealise human rationality and neglect its limits. With respect to design, however, Simon 
seems to underestimate human cognitive limitations—something we illustrated in some detail in The 
Cognitive Artifacts of Designing (Visser, 2006b).  
Several authors discuss differences between design and science (cf. also our introductory section). 
According to Archer (1979) "there exists a designerly way of thinking and communicating that is both 
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different from scientific and scholarly ways of thinking and communicating, and as powerful as scientific and 
scholarly methods of enquiry when applied to its own kinds of problems" (p. 18). This idea of "designerly 
ways of knowing" is further developed by Cross (1982) (see also Cross, 2006). 
Lawson (1979/1984) compared students from architecture and science (using artificial tasks supposed to 
represent architectural-design activities). He observed that the science students analysed their problems in 
order to discover their structure, whereas the design students generated "a sequence of high scoring solutions 
until one proved acceptable" (p. 218). Lawson's (1979/1984) conclusion has constituted one of the bases for 
distinguishing architects from scientists, encountered in papers qualifying architects as "solution-focused" and 
scientists as "problem-focused" (see also Kruger & Cross, 2006). Other studies seem to show, however, that a 
solution-focused approach is related to one's experience (Cross, 2004b; Lloyd & Scott, 1994). 
In addition, various authors perceive elements of similitude between scientific and design activities. In his 
analysis of the structure of design processes, Dasgupta (1989), for example, considers design problem solving 
a special instance of scientific discovery. In The Sciences of the Artificial, Simon (1969/1999) establishes a 
correspondence between social design (social planning) and scientific discovery: they share a type of search, 
that is, a "search guided by only the most general heuristics of 'interestingness' or novelty" (p. 162). Cagan, 
Kotovsky and Simon (2001) point out the cognitive and computational similarities between the "seemingly 
disparate activities" of scientific discovery and inventive engineering design (p. 442). They notice that highly 
creative design activities are often labelled invention. The major conclusion of the authors' comparison is that, 
"at a deep level, the cognitive and computational processes that accomplish [design and discovery] are 
virtually identical" (Cagan et al., 2001, p. 463). These underlying cognitive activities are based on "problem 
solving, pattern recognition, analogical reasoning, and other cognitive knowledge retrieval mechanisms" (pp. 
452-453). The authors thus defend, with respect to scientific-discovery and inventive engineering-design 
problems, their "nothing special position" (see point ii in Section 1). They establish, however, a "fundamental 
difference" between the two: "the goal of the process: Scientific explanation versus creation of a new 
artifact. . . . Design starts with a desired function and tries to synthesize a device that produces that function. 
Science starts with an existing function and tries to synthesize a mechanism that can plausibly accomplish or 
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account for that function" (Cagan et al., 2001, p. 455). We do not share this reserve concerning the goals of 
the two activities: in our view, ultimately science (be it discovery or invention) is a design activity, the 
artefact aimed here being a theory. 
In short, except with respect to expertise, there is little direct evidence for design differing significantly 
from nondesign. Indirect evidence might come from the previous section. Implicitly, our stance is that the 
characteristics presented in Section 1 are specific to design and make design differ from nondesign. However, 
we cannot refer to empirical studies that show this. 
3. Design is one, but takes different forms 
The idea that there may be different forms of design has been hinted at in informal discussions, generally 
without empirical or theoretical evidence (Löwgren, 1995; Ullman et al., 1988). Without any such 
underpinning, for example, the engineering-design methodologists Hubka and Eder (1987) assert that "the 
object of a design activity, what is being designed… substantially influences the design process." This 
assertion expresses a rather generally—more or less implicitly—accepted idea, that is, that the artefact 
product, characterising the design discipline (architecture, mechanical, or software design) is the variable 
underlying the differences we are examining here.  
In "Variants in design cognition," Akin (2001) states that "in different fields of design, cognitive 
processes have both similarities and differences" (p. 105). The author focuses on architectural design, 
generally contrasting it with engineering design in his paper. Compared to other designers, architects are more 
inclined to use (i) "rich representations," (ii) creative, inventive strategies, (iii) non-standard problem 
decomposition schemata, (iv) complexity management strategies, and (v) search for alternative solutions. 
(i) On the basis of his extensive research on architects, Akin (2001) affirms that these designers use many 
forms of both analog and symbolic, "naïve," everyday and physical, technical, and domain-specific 
representations. 
(ii) Confronting both informal observations and experimental work (Akin, 1986a) on architects and 
experimental results concerning electrical engineering designers obtained by Ball et al. (1997, quoted in 
Akin, 2001), Akin (2001) considers as plausible that "architects tend towards creative design strategies 
while engineers tend to routine design." His comparison between the architects in his Akin (1986a) study 
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producing a richness in novel solutions to constrained, closed problems, and the engineers observed by 
Ball et al. (1997, quoted in Akin, 2001) generating remarkably low numbers of solutions, leads him to 
suppose that "these engineers tend to apply routine-design strategies even when the problem calls for a 
novel solution." 
(iii) Akin (2001) opposes the conclusion reached by himself and by colleagues that architects adopt 
individual decomposition schemata, to that formulated by research colleagues (Frankenberger, 1997, and 
Dörner, 1997, quoted in Akin, 2001) that mechanical engineers and industrial designers use standardised 
schemata. This holds for both the decomposition of the global design process into design phases and that 
of a larger problem into smaller ones. 
(iv) For Akin (2001), the way in which designers recompose a comprehensive design solution from partial 
ones as an indicator of the way in which they manage complexity. Based on a study he conducted in 
1994 (referred to in his chapter), Akin (2001) explains how architects use ad hoc strategies to integrate 
partial solutions into global ones. He opposes this approach to the predetermined procedures that 
electronic or mechanical designers use to handle the interaction between the parts of a VLSI circuit or a 
mechanical assembly. 
(v) Akin (1986a) observed that architects continue their search for alternative solutions even if they have 
already formulated a satisfactory concept. They do not commit themselves prematurely to an early 
selected kernel idea, something that is often considered a general characteristic of designers (cf. 
characteristic iv in Section 1). 
Concerning the second point: various authors have observed that other designers than architects—for 
example, product designers (Dorst & Cross, 2001; Rodgers, Green, & McGown, 2000; Van der Lugt, 2002)—
may also act in creative, flexible ways (something distinctive for architects, according to Akin).  
Concerning the last point, we have requested more inspection of the basis for the conclusions about 
premature commitment that are generally advanced in the cognitive design research literature (Visser, 2006b). 
There are experimental results supporting Ball and Ormerod's (2000) hypothesis that design induces early 
fixation on a kernel idea when designers are working individually and/or in artificially restricted situations, 
and that professional designers collaborating in "natural," real work situations may come up with more 
alternative solutions (Visser, 1993a). There are, however, also studies (1) on teams working in de-
contextualised situations that show designers willing to reconsider early concepts (Smith and Tjandra, 1998, 
referred to in Cross, 2001a), and (2) on individually working designers who come up with several solution 
ideas, (2a) while they are working in artificially restricted conditions (Eastman, 1969: bathroom design; 
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Fricke, 1999: engineering design; Whitefield, 1989: mechanical design), but also (2b) in natural situations 
(Reitman, 1964: musical composition) (see also Atman, Chimka, Bursic, & Nachtmann, 1999, quoted in 
Cross, 2004b). The apparent contradiction between these observations might be removed in at least two ways. 
(i) Designers may aspire—or simply think or declare—to refrain from premature commitment, but in fact 
not put these ideas in practice (see also Malhotra et al., 1980; cf. our observation that designers' accounts 
about their activity often do not coincide with their actual activity, Visser, 1990).  
(ii) Early on in the design process, working at a conceptual level, designers may select a kernel idea, but 
afterwards they may refrain from premature commitment at a more concrete or detailed level, for 
example, by not fixing all values for its variables. 
Purcell and Gero (1996) have observed a difference between mechanical and product designers as regards 
their susceptibility to use features of example designs. In certain situations, mechanical designers showed 
"[design] fixation in the traditional sense of reproducing the characteristics of [an example] design, including 
incorrect features" (p. 381). They did so when "the example shown embodied principles that were typical of 
the knowledge base of the discipline" (p. 381). However, when they received innovative design examples, 
they seemed to "identify [the core innovative principle involved in the example] and then explore how this 
could be used in the particular design situation" (p. 381), leaving out of the designs they produced many of 
the specific aspects of the example. With the product designers, the fixation effect was completely absent. 
However, to produce innovative designs, these designers did not use the innovative examples either. Maybe 
they became "fixated" "on being different" (p. 381); maybe their search was for difference rather than for 
innovation (p. 380). The authors suggest two sources for the observed differences between the designers from 
the two disciplines. First, education: that of product designers may emphasize creativity and the search for 
many different ideas. Second, the more or less varying and/or articulated character of knowledge in a domain: 
"the areas of knowledge that make up industrial design are more diverse than those studied in mechanical 
engineering" (p. 374) and many of them "are associated with less well articulated bodies of knowledge than 
those that make up the knowledge base of mechanical engineering. For example, aesthetics plays a prominent 
role in industrial design education…, while it plays little formal role in mechanical engineering" (pp. 374-
375).  
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Through several studies of designers from different domains working in their daily professional situation 
(software and various types of mechanical design), we have been able to identify differences between such 
professionals working on industrial or other commercial design projects and design-knowledgeable 
participants (generally students) solving design problems in artificially restricted situations (generally 
laboratory experiments) (Visser, 1995, 2006b, 2006c). Three notable differences are the following. (1) In 
software, mechanical, or other professional design projects, designers organise their activity in an 
opportunistic way, whereas in simpler, more restricted situations, designers are often able to follow systematic 
decompositional approaches (as generally prescribed by normative methods, e.g. top-down, breadth-first; cf. 
our discussion above in Section 1). (2) Reuse of elements from previous projects seems a specific professional 
design approach—even if it has also been observed in experimental research (Détienne, 2002). (3) In our 
study of a professional software designer (Visser, 1987b), we noticed that user considerations were among his 
guiding principles (leading him, for example, to adopt certain variable-naming strategies), an observation that 
has not been mentioned by researchers studying design in artificially restricted situations. These observations, 
which do not seem specific to a particular domain of design, may point to the influence that is exerted on the 
activity of design by (1) design education, (2) the complexity of a design project, and (3) the design setting. 
In the cognitive design research literature, one frequently encounters allusions to, or implicit testimonies 
of the specific character of software design compared to other types of design (see Visser, 2006b; 2006c for a 
discussion of these attitudes). Even if design of HCI is much less the object of discussion in this context, 
researchers studying software design or HCI have themselves also contrasted their domain of research with 
other domains. The responsible variables remain, however, unexplored. In their bibliographic cocitation 
analysis, Atwood, McCain, and Williams (2002) found that a set of authors representing Software 
Engineering design methodologies was "essentially unconnected with the remainder of the author set" 
(p. 129). They noticed, "software design has its own design literature" (p. 132). On the other hand, generic 
design journals, such as Design Studies, Design Issues, or The Journal of Design Research rarely publish 
papers on software or HCI design. The separation between software and HCI, and other types of design holds 
for scientific events as well. Conferences in the domain of design research concern either software design 
and/or HCI (i.e., treated either together or singly), or other types of design. Of course, there are specialised 
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conferences in many domains of design, but when they announce, as their object, "design" without any further 
specification, conferences generally do not expect papers on software or HCI (for a list of example references, 
see Visser, 2006b, Section. 22.1). 
Refining our analysis initiated in Visser (2006b; 2006c) and continued in Visser (2006a), this paper 
proposes three dimensions that we suppose underlie differences between forms of design: the design process, 
the designer, and the artefact. Under each of these dimensions, we propose several variables. 
3.1 PROCESS 
Various process-related variables may affect designers' cognitive structures and activities, and the designs 
they produce. We identified the organisation of the design process, the tools used, and the place of the user in 
the design process, possibly specified into two or more variables that are more specific. 
3.1.1 The organisation of the design process 
The way designers plan to organise their task or the process they are involved in is liable to influence their 
activity. Be the organisation imposed by one's hierarchy, or devised by oneself, it works as other tools: it not 
only structures, but also guides people's activity, through immaterial and material means, such as design 
methods and other tools, be they representational, or calculation and simulation aids (cf. subsection 3.1.2, 
Tools in use). 
The time scale of the design process. Design is considered an off-line activity. One might thus naively 
suppose that designers, contrary to, for example, controllers of dynamic situations, have all their time to think 
over their projects, to analyse and change views, to discuss and confront their opinions with colleagues. The 
reality is different. First, most industrial, or other professional design projects generally take place under 
temporal constraints. Their stringency, however, may differ depending on external organisational (due to the 
workshop or the client), artefactual, and other factors. Second, planning—both as a design activity in itself 
and as a component of other design activities (Visser, 1994b)—is obviously subject to temporal variables. 
Several early empirical studies have examined the role of temporal constraints in the context of planning, for 
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example, the famous study on route-plan design by Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1979). We will come back 
to temporal constraints in our discussion of "designing in space versus designing in time" (section 3.3.3). 
Individual versus collective design. Certain artefacts are designed generally by an individual designer, others 
are usually the work of a team. Complexity and size of the artefact (two dimensions mentioned by Gross, 
2003) may play a role in this association, but are certainly not the only variables. Product design is often 
performed by individual designers, whereas many engineering design projects are conducted collectively—
but, of course, these are only tendencies. 
We have defended elsewhere that there is no reason to suppose that cooperation modifies the nature of the 
basic cognitive activities and operations implemented in design (i.e., generation, transformation, and 
evaluation of representations) (Visser, 1993a). Because cooperation proceeds through interaction, it 
introduces, however, specific activities and influences designers' representational structures (both on 
sociocognitive and emotional levels). Some examples of such activities are coordination, operative 
synchronisation, construction of interdesigner compatible representations, conflict resolution, and 
management of representations that differ between design partners through confrontation, articulation, and 
integration. Activities involving argumentation—that is, in our view, activities aiming to modify the 
representations held by one's interlocutors—obviously play a particularly important role. The construction of 
interdesigner compatible representations (Visser, 2006b, 2006c), their existence beside designers' private 
representations, and their management introduce factors that may add complexity to collective design 
situations compared to individual design. 
3.1.2 Tools in use 
Given our view of design as the construction of representations, we privilege representational tools in this 
discussion, especially concerned with external representations and the means to produce them. Designers' 
internal (mental) representations evidently also play a crucial role in their activity, but these representations 
are mainly dependent on other components of the situation and on individual factors.  
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Design methods. By definition, designers proceed differently depending on the method they follow. In the 
domain of software design, several authors have compared the use of different design paradigms (in the sense 
of design methods) and observed differences, both with respect to activities and to resulting designs. 
Lee and Pennington (1994), for example, have shown these two types of differences between software 
design using an object-oriented and using a procedural paradigm. With respect to the activity, the differences 
concerned the domain and solution spaces developed, the duration of problem domain analysis and of solution 
evaluation. As also observed by other authors (see references in Lee & Pennington, 1994), the resulting 
designs "[reflected] fundamentally different models of the solution. Procedural design methodologies result in 
designs in which the modules represent procedures that complete subparts of the task, whereas object-oriented 
methodologies result in modules that represent objects in the environment" (p. 581; for other differences, see 
the paper). 
Kim and Lerch (1992), in their comparison between object-oriented (OOD) and "traditional functional 
decomposition" (TFD) methodologies, expected "OOD to radically change the cognitive processes in logical 
design" (p. 491). Based on the preliminary results obtained in a pilot study, the authors noted that "OOD may 
achieve substantial time savings over TFD in logical design.… 1) by simplifying rule induction processes 
used in functional decomposition; 2) by guiding designers on how to build more effective problem spaces; 
and 3) by allowing designers to run mental simulation more efficiently and more effectively" (p. 489). 
The maturity of a domain may influence the availability—and thus the use—of tools. In 2004, the NSF 
launched a "Science of Design" program aiming to "develop a set of scientific principles to guide the design 
of software-intensive systems" (Science of Design, 2004). An underlying idea was that "in fields more mature 
than computer science [such as architecture and other engineering disciplines, for example, civil or chemical 
engineering], design methodology has traditionally relied heavily on constructs such as languages and 
notational conventions, modularity principles, composition rules, methodical decision procedures and 
handbooks of codified experience .… However, the design of software-intensive systems is more often done 
using rough guidelines, intuition and experiential knowledge." 
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As noticed above, research in the domain of software design has shown that design methodologies may 
have an influence on the activity and the resulting design. One may suppose that being familiar with the 
constructs and other tools that have been developed in a domain may influence, probably facilitate, a 
designer's activity—even if cognitive design research has shown the difficulty of designers' effectively 
working according to design methodology prescriptions (Carroll & Rosson, 1985; Visser, 2003; Visser & 
Hoc, 1990). 
One may notice that related to the idea that underlies the present variable and that is only touched upon 
here, is the question of well-defined versus ill-defined problems and the implications for the nature of the 
activities involving these problems (see Visser, 2006b, 2006c). From a cognitive-activity viewpoint, most or 
all ill-defined problems might be analysed as design problems (Visser, 1993b). Going one step further, Falzon 
(2004) proposes to adopt design as a paradigm for analysing all problem-solving activities. Eventually, Falzon 
posits, each design problem becomes a state-transformation problem (the type of problem typically examined 
in classical cognitive-psychology laboratory research), because of people's acquisition of expertise and habits, 
and of technological evolution. Falzon nevertheless also notes the possibility that there will always remain 
multiple situations in which people refuse themselves to refer to procedures and routines. As an example, he 
refers to a study by Lebahar concerning painters who try to establish conditions that rule out the possibility to 
refer to routines. 
External representations. According to Zhang and Norman (1994), external and internal representations 
differentially activate perceptual and cognitive processes. With Scaife and Rogers (1996), we presume that 
things are less systematic, and more complex. Nevertheless, we suppose that the use of internal and that of 
external representations involve processing differences. Therefore, designing may differ between situations 
depending on the importance of certain types of representations. One may suppose that, for example, design 
of physical artefacts (e.g., architectural or mechanical design) differs from design of symbolic artefacts (e.g., 
procedures or organisations). 
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Indeed, one of the factors underlying the differences between software and other types of design that are 
often stressed may be due to the different types of representations primarily used. A classical result in 
cognitive psychology research on external representations concerns the influence of representation "formats" 
on problem solving. The standard approach to show this effect has been to compare the way in which 
isomorphic problems were solved (for example, the Tower of Hanoi and the Tea Ceremony). Another 
difference in format is that between alphanumeric and figurative representations. The possibilities provided 
by sketches and other types of drawings compared to those offered by purely alphanumeric representations, 
for example, with respect to the ease of visualisation and manipulation and their corollaries may facilitate 
simulation and other forms of evaluation of what are going to become physical artefacts.  
This observation surely does not only apply to classical (i.e., nonvisual) forms of software design. It 
probably also holds for other symbolic artefacts, such as other types of procedures, plans, and organisational 
structures. 
According to Akin (2001), architects differ from designers in other domains with respect to their relatively 
more frequent use of (1) analogue compared to symbolic representations and (2) varying representations. The 
author attributes this greater representational variety to architectural design's situated and user-dependent 
character. Akin also points to the lack of universally accepted representational standards in architecture (cf. 
other elements of Akin's position presented in the introduction of Section 3). We already put into perspective 
Akin's view that architectural designers are particularly resourceful and flexible. However, the lack of 
standards, be they universally accepted or not, may indeed be of influence (see also our remark concerning 
The maturity of a domain, Section 3.1.2). 
According to Zimring and Craig (2001), disciplines of practice differ with respect to the ease or even the 
possibility for users to understand the intermediate and final representations of the artefact generally used in 
the domain. They assert that, for example, architectural drawings of layout or appearance of the building to be 
designed "are at least theoretically understandable by end-users…, resulting in patterns of collaboration, 
testing and accountability that differ significantly from those associated with more 'invisible' design 
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processes. An engineer, for example, working on a car engine is not likely to collaborate with end users 
directly, given the difficulty the average car driver has in understanding the mechanics of engines." (p. 128) 
With respect to the role of representation, we wish to state explicitly that the importance of its role 
undeniably also depends on the designer (discussed in Section 3.2).  
Possible means for evaluation. Domains differ in the methods and other tools that may be used in order to 
evaluate design proposals (Malhotra et al., 1980, pp. 129-130). In engineering, more or less "objective" 
measures and other criteria for future artefacts' performance can be used and different proposals can be ranked 
rather objectively. One can calculate whether a particular design (e.g., a bridge) meets particular functional 
requirements, such as accommodation and maximum load. The results of qualitative evaluation used in other 
domains, based on subjective criteria such as aesthetics, for example, may be more difficult to translate into a 
"score," and thus to compare. In between the extremes of completely objective and entirely subjective 
evaluation, exist different types of simulation, physical and mental. 
3.1.3 The user in the design process 
Designers design for other people, the "users" of the artefact product. In each domain of design, users are 
central—even if not always for the designers and even if the use of artefacts may (seem to) be more or less 
direct (cf. also The artefact's impact in Section 3.3.2). Naïvely, one might think, for example, that industrial 
design products (such as, pens, chairs, household boxes) are in "direct" use by their users, whereas the relation 
between the product of a city-planning project and its users is much less direct. Yet, domains differ with 
respect to their common practices regarding the way in which designers usually take into account the 
potential, future users and their use of the artefact product.  
Integration of user data into the design. In HCI, for example, there is a tradition and, correspondingly, 
considerable effort towards developing methods to integrate user data into the design. This has varied from 
such data being introduced into the design by design participants who "know" the users but are not users 
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themselves, to approaches such as participatory design in which the users have themselves a voice in the 
design process (Carroll, 2006).  
It seems likely that the number and variety of participants who take part in a design process influence this 
process, probably more its socio-organisational than its cognitive aspects (see also Section 3.1.1, Individual 
versus collective design). Yet, on a cognitive level, the difficulty of integration may increase with the number 
of different representations to be integrated—thus with the number of types of participants. In addition, the 
participation of "nontechnical" design participants (what users generally are) may introduce a specific 
difficulty, both for the nontechnical participants themselves and for their professional design colleagues. 
Gross (2003) mentions two specific user-related variables on which a piece of software is like a building: 
the difference or equivalence between client and user, and the type of use or user, which may change more or 
less, or may remain constant. These two variables get a particular weight in the context of the 
abovementioned influence that number and variety of participants may have on the design process. 
3.2 DESIGNER: INTERINDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
Differences between designers may affect both their activities and their representations. This influence 
may occur by way of one or more of the variables proposed hereafter. The use of certain types of 
representations or other tools may influence design thinking, but a particular designer may be more inclined to 
adopt a particular type of representation, or feel more at ease with its use. 
3.2.1 Design expertise 
A classical cognitive-psychology result confirmed in cognitive design research is that experts and novices in a 
domain differ as to their representations and activities. Experts, for example, "recognise underlying principles, 
rather than focusing on surface features of problems" (Cross, 2004b, p. 432). Expertise has been examined in 
many experimental studies on design (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988; Cross, 2004a, 2004c; "Expertise in Design," 
2004; Glaser, 1986; Glaser & Chi, 1988; Reimann & Chi, 1989). In Section 2, we saw that besides novice 
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designers differing from expert designers, design expertise in itself differs from that in other fields (Cross, 
2004b). 
We have proposed to distinguish, in addition to levels of expertise, types of expertise (Falzon & Visser, 
1989; see also Visser & Morais, 1991). We have indeed observed how designers who were "experts" in the 
same domain, but had different prior experience in that domain (workshop vs. laboratory), exhibited (1) 
different types of knowledge and (2) different organisations of their knowledge—a result comparable to that 
regarding levels of expertise. 
3.2.2 Routine character of a task 
The routine character of a task is not an objective characteristic of the task, but depends on the representation 
that people construct of it. This task characteristic is thus dependent on interindividual differences.  
Most design projects comprise both routine and nonroutine tasks. In a comparative analysis of three of our 
empirical design studies, we have established a link between the more or less routine character of a design 
project and the way in which analogies are used (at the action-execution and at the action-management levels) 
(Visser, 1996). This, in turn, influences, at least in part, the possibilities a designer has for reuse in a design 
project. 
3.2.3 Idiosyncrasies 
"The reality of professional design practice seems to be that individual designers have differing design 
abilities—some designers just seem to be better than others, and some are outstandingly good." (Cross, 2002a, 
p. 14) In addition to studies comparing experts and novices, there are clinical studies on experts that have led 
researchers to identify specific characteristics of particular experts (Cross, 2001c, 2002a). It seems, for 
example, that, contrary to most architects, Frank Lloyd Wright could imagine and develop a design entirely 
without using external representations, not sketching or drawing, be it until an advanced stage of the project 
(Tafel, 1979, quoted in Ball & Christensen, 2007), or even until the very end of the design process (Weisberg, 
1993, quoted in Bilda & Gero, 2005). Cross (2002a), who mentions several studies on exceptional designers, 
presents three case studies he has performed himself on creative design in engineering and product design. 
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Concerning the three designers whom he considers "exceptional," Cross (2002a) notices that "there appear to 
be striking similarities in their design strategies, which suggest that general models might be constructed of 
design expertise and creative processes in professional design practice" (p. 14).  
3.2.4 Different "types of people" 
An idea often encountered, especially among architects themselves, is that, rather than possessing 
idiosyncratic characteristics, architects (as members of the architectural profession) are of a "special kind," a 
different "type of people" than other designers, especially, software designers or engineers. Architects would 
have a different "personality": they would be, for example, more creative and more aesthetics-oriented. 
Several researchers, architects themselves or not, also defend such an idea. Akin (2001), for example, 
considers that architects attribute another value to creative and unique designs than other designers do. 
Besides advancing more tangible differences presented above (see the introduction of Section 3), Akin (2001) 
claims that "the profession of architecture rewards the heart while engineering rewards the brain" (p. 105). He 
notes explicitly, however, that the specificities of architects are not biological or physiological, "or even 
fundamental intelligence related." Akin (2001) believes that "it is a matter of ethos and culture fostered in a 
given profession, its educational philosophy and the predisposition of its participants." 
"Personality" is a familiar notion in psychology (nearly every theoretical tradition in psychology has its 
own personality theory), which, as many notions from the social sciences and humanities, is widely used 
outside of this discipline. The personality-related difference between architects and other designers, however, 
does have no scientific basis: we are unaware of any empirical study concerning possible "personality 
differences" between designers working in different domains. 
3.3 ARTEFACT 
We have identified three artefact variables: social embeddedness, type of artefact (instantiated by 
structures versus processes), and artefacts' evolution. Gross (2003) proposes the proportion of reusable 
components in the artefact's structure as one of the factors that make "a piece of software like a building," but 
we do not have any data or hypotheses concerning such a variable. 
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3.3.1 Social embeddedness 
Referring to Rittel and Webber (1973/1984), Zimring and Craig (2001) point to the social embeddedness 
of planning and design problems. In their analysis of societal planning problems as "wicked," Rittel and 
Webber (1973/1984) indeed attribute the major part of this wickedness to the social embeddedness of these 
problems. Neither Rittel and Webber (1973/1984), nor Zimring and Craig (2001) define the notion. Our 
definition is based on Edmond (1999)s' constructivist approach: social embeddedness refers to the extent to 
which an appropriate characterisation of an agent's activities and representations requires that one include the 
agent's social environment ("the society of agents" in Edmond's terms) as a whole in the characterisation.  
We consider that it is not an externally defined task that is more or less socially embedded, but people's 
representations involved in dealing with it. Qualifying a design project as socially embedded is then shorthand 
for qualifying as such the designer's representations of that project (an analogous remark holds for "a project's 
ill definedness" as shorthand for "the ill definedness of the representations that the designer has constructed of 
the project"). A project can become socially embedded because the designers or other stakeholders consider 
necessary to take into account the insertion and future position of the artefact in its environment 
(characterised by its users and/or the global society).  
In apparent opposition with what we advanced above concerning user involvement in design, one might 
think that a product design project is less socially embedded than an urban project; that development of HCI 
involves more social embeddedness than traffic signal design, for example. Given our view that the view held 
by the designers or other stakeholders makes a project socially embedded, this quality is not limited to what 
are generally considered "social" or "societal" problems. Even if societal planning problems generally will be 
socially embedded, this characteristic is not specific to planning problems: for example, planning one's route 
through a city (Chalmé, Visser, & Denis, 2004; Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979) or planning a meal (Byrne, 
1977) are not necessarily typical instances of socially embedded problems. Yet, planning a meal can become 
socially embedded depending on the meal "designers"' view of their guests and of the consequences 
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occasioned by the meal's more or less greater "success"—and as such, designers' activity will be influenced 
by their view.  
The influence of social embeddedness on a designer's activities is probably similar to that of ill 
definedness. For example, socially embedded problems probably have various, different solutions. These 
solutions may be considered more or less appropriate, more or less acceptable, depending on the criteria 
adopted by the person who judges them. 
A related issue in which societal questions play an important role is the consideration of an artefact's user 
in the design of the artefact (see Section 3.1.3, The user in the design process). Winograd (1996) considers 
that its user-oriented character makes software design comparable to architectural and graphic design, and 
different from engineering design. He considers, however, that the design of interactive software is 
completely different from other software design (Winograd, 1997). Among the arguments advanced for these 
claims, none is based on cognitive analyses of the activity. 
Simon (1969/1999), in Sciences of the Artificial, implicitly establishes a radical distinction between design 
activities in engineering and in social design. In his discussion of social planning, Simon (1969/1999) states 
that "representation problems take on new dimensions" in this form of design (and, maybe, also in inventive 
engineering design, see Visser, 2006b, 2006c) compared with the "relatively well-structured, middle-sized 
tasks" of engineering and architectural design (p. 141), which he presents—implicitly—as the prototypes of 
design. For "real-world problems of [the] complexity" of social planning, Simon considers that designers may 
refer to "weaker" criteria than in the case of standard design. Processes such as "search guided by only the 
most general heuristics of 'interestingness' or novelty" may provide "the most suitable model of the social 
design process" (Simon, 1969/1999, p. 162). With respect to the sources of social design problems' greater 
"complexity," Simon suggests that differences of at least three types may be involved: problems' degree of 
structuredness (here qualified as "definedness"), their size, and the nature of their object (see our detailed 
discussion of these differences in Visser, 2006b, 2006c).  
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It seems that only when he discusses social problems (and perhaps scientific discovery problems, see the 
introduction to Section 2 Design is different from nondesign) that Simon seriously considers human bounded 
rationality and takes into account the role of what he calls "representations without numbers," generative 
constraints such as "interestingness" or "novelty," and critical constraints such as the "defensibility" of a 
decision. The hypothesis that we have formulated in order to explain—at least, in part—this view of design 
adopted by Simon is that he considers (1) (routine) engineering and architectural design as standard design, 
and (2) social planning as radically different from standard design. 
In ever more domains, people become convinced of the societal aspects of their action. One may suppose 
that this evolution will have its influence on design. "The common thread in the new approach to traffic 
engineering is a recognition that the way you build a road affects far more than the movement of vehicles. It 
determines how drivers behave on it, whether pedestrians feel safe to walk alongside it, what kinds of 
businesses and housing spring up along it." (McNichol, 2004) (see also tendencies such as ecodesign, 
ecological design, and sustainable design, see, e.g., Méhier, 2005) (cf. the next subsection, where we discuss 
the influence of users' interaction with artefacts on designers' activities—especially those related to the 
anticipation of the artefact's behaviour over time). 
3.3.2 Artefacts' evolution 
"Interactive systems are designed to have a certain behavior over time, whereas houses typically are not," 
according to Löwgren (1995, p. 94). Even if this assertion is questionable with respect to "behaviour" in 
general, behaviour over time is a variable on which artefacts differ—and the types of behaviour of different 
artefact products are quite diverse. An artefact's behaviour over time may be related to its impact on people 
(the "transformative" nature of artefacts, see Carroll, Rosson, Chin, & Koenemann, 1998), through the 
interaction that people engage in, and to its use by people who are not necessarily transformed by this use. It 
may also be due to its deterioration, dependently or independently of people. Two variables introduced by 
Gross (2003) are the degree to which components of the artefact may be subject to change or renewal, and the 
more or less extended lifetime of the artefact. 
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All artefacts change over time. Houses may not display "behaviour" over time, but they change. Systems 
such as organisations or interactive systems are subject to specific types of change. Designers are supposed to 
anticipate the transformation that their artefact products undergo—be it of deterioration or another evolution 
type. The possibility of anticipation may vary between situations (domains), not necessarily depending on the 
degree of impact. It depends, among others things, on the possibility to simulate the artefact, or to test it in 
another way. For interactive artefacts, anticipation may be performed through simulation. The future 
behaviour of certain technical artefacts may be anticipated based on calculations.  
The artefact's impact on people's activity and the possibility to anticipate it. Predicting people's future use of 
an artefact product and further anticipating the impact of the product on human activity, is one of the 
"characteristic and difficult properties" of designing (Carroll, 2000, p. 39). Indeed, "design has broad impacts 
on people. Design problems lead to transformations in the world that alter possibilities for human activity and 
experience, often in ways that transcend the boundaries of the original design reasoning" (Carroll, 2000, p. 
21). Gross (2003) mentions sanitary risks and safety concerns that particular uses or states of an artefact may 
introduce. 
Even if all design has impact on people, certain domains seem more sensitive than others are. HCI, with 
which Carroll (2000) is especially concerned in his discussion quoted above, is an example of a domain in 
which design has particularly broad impacts on people. Yet, this holds for all design with societal 
implications. 
Distance between intermediary representations and final product. The design of an artefact is a different 
activity than its implementation (Visser, 2006b, 2006c). For certain types of artefacts, however, there seems 
to be a relatively fluid, steady transition between the different forms that the design concept may take and the 
final artefact product—what may be qualified as a shorter "distance" between the two. Symbolic artefacts, 
such as software, are an example. This might elucidate somewhat our observation that software designers find 
it particularly difficult to separate design from coding (Visser, 1987b). It does not imply, however, that design 
and implementation are not distinct for symbolic artefacts. 
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It is with respect to the distance between the design concept and the final artefact product that Löwgren 
(1995, p. 94) opposes architectural and engineering design to "external" software design ("design of the 
external behavior and appearance of the product, the services it offers to users and its place in the 
organization").  
Delay of implementation. Design is by definition concerned with artefact products that do not yet exist. A 
central aspect of designing is thus, once again, anticipation. The bases of this anticipation may vary depending 
on other variables (users' taking part and designer's knowledge, experience, and activities, such as simulation), 
but anyhow the conditions of existence, the behaviour, and the use of the artefact products will be more or 
less different from those anticipated: the world changes without possibility of being completely controlled. 
The implementation of certain types of artefacts is much longer in coming than that of others—and not 
because of laziness or indifference of the workshop or the client, or due to lack of resources. Voss et al. 
(1983) have noticed that the solving of social-science problems is particularly difficult because of the "delay 
from the time a solution is proposed and accepted to when it is fully implemented" (p. 169). Such a delay 
clearly complicates the anticipation of the artefact's evolution and other matters involved in its evaluation 
(through simulation or other means). Even if this observation is particularly applicable to social-science 
problems, it may also hold for other types of design. 
3.3.3 Type of artefact 
"Type of artefact" may seem an evident explanatory variable for the existence of different forms of design. 
As noticed already, however, few elements are available concerning underlying variables. An example is 
software design—often considered as "essentially different" from design in other domains, but without 
discussion or examination of the responsible variables. One candidate variable could be the difference 
between structures and processes. Data concerning the influence of this variable may come from results 
obtained in studies concerning what may be considered particular instances of structures and processes, that 
is, spatial and temporal entities.  
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Designing in space versus designing in time. Studies comparing problems governed by temporal and 
problems governed by spatial constraints have shown that designers deal differently with these constraints 
(Chalmé et al., 2004; detailed in Visser, 2006b). An example of design that preferentially implements 
temporal constraints is planning (meal planning, see Byrne, 1977; route planning, see Chalmé et al., 2004; 
Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979). Research, however, has not yet settled clearly the specificity of the relative 
ease and difficulty involved in the corresponding types of design—it has even less identified the underlying 
factors.  
Structures (which may correspond to states) are not necessarily spatially constrained, but processes have 
systematically temporal characteristics. By analogy to the differences between the cognitive treatment of 
spatial and temporal constraints, one may expect that structures and processes are represented differently 
(especially mentally, but also externally), thus processed differently, and therefore lead to different design 
activities (cf. Clancey's, 1985, distinction between configuration and planning). 
4. Conclusion 
In this section, we will first briefly review the generic-design hypothesis and then focus on the component 
of our augmented generic-design hypothesis that has been central in this text, that is, design also takes 
different forms. 
The validity of the generic-design hypothesis. Given the scarcity of empirical evidence, the generic-design 
hypothesis needs more research. We formulated above several points of reserve concerning the only 
systematic study (Goel & Pirolli, 1989; 1992), but we have presented, in Sections 1 and 2, various elements of 
support for the hypothesis' two components. The hypothesis requires, however, more research, especially 
more systematic research. 
The validity of the hypothesis that design also takes different forms. If because of the rare and disseminated 
empirical evidence, the generic-design hypothesis needs more research, this holds a fortiori for our hypothesis 
that design also takes different forms. Most variables proposed were based on a broad knowledge and analysis 
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of the results of some 25 years of cognitive design research; they would need comparative studies about the 
hypothesised differences between design situations. For some of them, we were able to present precise 
empirical data: for differences between architectural design and engineering design (Akin, 2001), and 
between mechanical and product design (Purcell & Gero, 1996), between design in a professional project and 
design in an artificially restricted situation (Visser, 1995, 2006b, 2006c), between design activities and 
resulting designs in projects adopting different design methods (Kim & Lerch, 1992; Lee & Pennington, 
1994); for differences due to designers' expertise (for levels of expertise, see especially Cross' work; for types 
of expertise, see Falzon & Visser, 1989); for the influence of design projects' routine character on the way in 
which designers use analogy (Visser, 1996), and the influence of idiosyncratic differences between designers 
(shown for certain experts, see several references in the text).  
Therefore, in the analysis presented in this paper, we have introduced material that still requires further 
analysis, and indicated a number of directions—to be followed, modified, completed, and developed, in other 
research. 
It is conceivable that not all variables proposed have the same degree of influence. Given our view of 
design as the construction of representations, we suppose that variables related to representational structures 
and activities are particularly influential. Referring to classical research on the influence of representation 
formats on problem solving, we formulated the hypothesis that sketches and other types of drawings may 
facilitate certain activities (such as simulation and other forms of evaluation), due to the augmented ease of 
visualisation and manipulation offered by such figurative external representations. Yet, variables may also 
depend on other underlying factors and their influence on the activity may exert itself by way of 
representational structures and activities.  
The variables and the characteristics of the different forms of activities and cognitive structures—if their 
influence were to be confirmed—may have implications for design support. Given the centrality of 
representation in designing, the development of appropriate support modalities for representational activities 
and structures already suggests itself—be such modalities technological (generally, computerised) or 
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methodological. However, according to the role of representation, and the type of representation preferentially 
used in specific design tasks and/or in specific design situations, the development of specific support 
modalities may be worthwhile. Research on these questions may take advantage of the progress already 
obtained in other domains, for example, those of software and HCI design. In those domains, there has been 
considerable research on visualisation and other visual tools, for example, on diagrammatic reasoning (see 
Blackwell, 1997, and the Diagrammatic reasoning site; see also the research on multiple —external—
representations, e.g. by Van Someren, Reimann, Boshuizen, & De Jong, 1988). 
A question that might be asked after the presentation of all these—possibly—different forms of design is: 
if there are so many differences between the implementations of design thinking in different situations, then 
what about the idea that design is a "generic" activity? In order to answer this question—and counter the 
underlying opposition to the generic-design hypothesis—we now come up with the fourth member of our 
augmented cognitively oriented generic-design hypothesis. In its complete form, we see this hypothesis as the 
following. 
(1) Design thinking has distinctive characteristics from other cognitive activities. 
(2) There are commonalities between the implementations of design thinking in different design 
situations. 
(3) There are also differences between these implementations of design thinking in different situations. 
(4) However, the commonalities between all the different forms of design thinking are sufficiently 
distinctive from the characteristics of other cognitive activities, to consider design a specific, generic 
cognitive activity. 
Given the hypothetical character of the third member, which was examined here, we did not mention this 
fourth member before. If one defends the idea of design as a generic cognitive activity, it is, however, the 
counterpart of the third member. At the end of this paper, this fourth member remains completely hypothetical 
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and requires new empirical research comparable to Goel and Pirolli's (1989) work—but preferably, in our 
opinion, performed in real, i.e. professional design situations. 
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